Must the House Always Win?:
A Critique of Rousso v. State
Rachel J. Schaefer*
“[A]ny American with a broadband connection and a checking account can engage in any form of Internet gambling from any state.”1

I. INTRODUCTION
Gambling enthusiasts in Washington may be dismayed to learn that
while it is legal to place a wager at one of the numerous brick-and-mortar
casinos located in the state,2 placing the same wager over the Internet is a
crime.3 This result arises from a 2006 amendment to Washington Revised Code 9.46.240 (the Gambling Act), which effectively bans individuals from placing bets or wagers over the Internet from Washington.4 In
addition to prohibiting bets made by individuals, the law also prohibits
Internet gambling businesses from receiving bets placed by individuals
in Washington—even if those gambling businesses operate far from the
state’s borders.5
Washington’s Gambling Act is merely one component in a complex—and often contradictory—regulatory scheme on Internet gambling.
Internet gambling laws operate at both the state and federal levels in
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J.D. Seattle University, 2012; A.B. Mount Holyoke College, 2006. I would like to thank my mother, whose enthusiasm for all forms of gambling is both an inspiration and a concern. I am also grateful for the thoughtful critiques given to me by the members of the Seattle University Law Review,
including Carrie Hobbs, Ryan Castle, Brian Pinkerton, and Elliot Watson. Hello, Claire.
1. Sewell Chan, Congress Rethinks Its Ban on Internet Gambling, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/29/us/politics/29gamble.html.
2. “[W]hile Lee Rousso can walk into any of Washington’s licensed card rooms and lawfully
compete with other patrons in a game of poker, if he turns on his computer and plays the same game
over the Internet, he commits a felony under the Gambling Act and can be imprisoned for five
years.” Brief for the Poker Players Alliance as Amicus Curiae in Support of Lee H. Rousso at 2,
Rousso v. State, 239 P.3d 1084 (Wash. 2010) (No. 83040-1), 2010 WL 2206096.
3. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.46.240 (criminalizing Internet gambling); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 9A.20.021 (defining the punishment associated with Internet gambling).
4. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.46.240.
5. See id.
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what is best described as a “regulatory and enforcement quagmire.”6 At
the locus of this regulatory scheme are two federal laws that purport to
ban Internet gambling businesses from operating in the United States by
criminalizing the interstate transmissions of bets and wagers.7 Both federal laws, however, recognize the authority of states to pass laws on the
subject of gambling.8 Against this backdrop, some states, like Washington, prohibit Internet gambling.9
But not all states agree that online gambling should be banned.
Some states, perhaps looking to increase tax revenues and close budget
deficits, have recently considered legalizing the activity. In 2011 alone,
lawmakers in Iowa, California, Florida, and New Jersey introduced bills
to legalize certain forms of online gambling.10 Given the alluring prospect of Internet gambling operations to be a source for local jobs and
revenue, other states may soon follow with similar proposals.11 Should
these proposals become law, it is possible that some states may permit
individuals to place bets over the Internet, while other states forbid such
activity—a result that may have inconsistent consequences in light of the
“borderless” nature of the Internet.
In addition to the potential for inconsistencies within this regulatory
quagmire, state Internet gambling regulations raise constitutional questions that invoke federalism12 concerns. Whereas Internet gambling is of
federal purview because the funds wagered pass over state lines,13 regulation of gambling has traditionally been an exercise of state police pow6. Chan, supra note 1.
7. See infra Part II.B.
8. See Charles P. Ciaccio, Jr., Internet Gambling: Recent Developments and State of the Law,
25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 529, 532–47 (2010).
9. At least eight states have made Internet gambling illegal. See Jonathan Conon, Comment,
Aces and Eights: Why the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act Resides in “Dead Man’s”
Land in Attempting to Further Curb Online Gambling and Why Expanded Criminalization is Preferable to Legalization, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1157, 1173 (2009).
10. Alexandra Berzon, States Make Play for Web Gambling, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703409904576174730883294102.html?KEYWOR
DS=internet+gambling. In 2001, Nevada considered legalizing all forms of Internet gambling in a
law that would allow for “interactive gaming.” Ciaccio, supra note 8, at 548. But the state dropped
this proposal after the Department of Justice announced that it considered all interstate Internet gambling illegal under the Wire Act. Id. In 2011, the state renewed its attempt to become the center of
the gambling industry when it proposed regulations that would permit certain forms of intrastate
online gambling. Alexandra Berzon, Nevada Sets Framework for Internet Poker, WALL ST. J., Dec.
22, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204464404577115182815513366.html.
11. NAT’L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM’N, FINAL REPORT ch. 1, at 6 (June 18, 1999),
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/reports/finrpt.html.
12. Federalism is defined as “the legal relationship and distribution of power between the national and regional governments within a federal system of government.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 687 (9th ed. 2009).
13. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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er within an individual state’s borders.14 Before the Washington State
Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Rousso v. State, it was uncertain
whether a state such as Washington could regulate Internet gambling
without running afoul of federal constitutional authority. Yet in Rousso,
the supreme court affirmed the state’s authority to regulate Internet gambling.15 Ultimately, the court upheld the law under the dormant Commerce Clause, determining that the Gambling Act did not impermissibly
interfere with the federal government’s authority to regulate interstate
commerce.16
As the first decision addressing the constitutionality of a state Internet gambling law,17 the Washington State Supreme Court’s decision in
Rousso is significant. In light of recent state proposals to legalize Internet
gambling, Rousso will likely become persuasive precedent as other
courts struggle to determine whether other state Internet gambling laws
will share a similar fate. However, the Washington State Supreme
Court’s reasoning in Rousso may leave these states with more questions
than answers. Specifically, the court’s conclusory and incomplete reasoning provides little guidance for how future courts may assess the constitutionality of state Internet gambling laws.
This Note critiques the Washington State Supreme Court’s decision
in Rousso and proposes that future courts should adopt the reasoning articulated by the Washington Court of Appeals when assessing the constitutionality of state Internet gambling laws. To that end, this Note proceeds in five Parts. Part II explains the social concerns associated with
Internet gambling and outlines the federal and state laws that seek to address those concerns. Part III outlines the origin, principles, and legal
standard of the dormant Commerce Clause, the doctrine used by Washington courts to assess the constitutionality of the state’s Internet gambling ban. Part IV then discusses the legal challenge in Rousso, beginning with a background of the case and concluding with the court’s application of the dormant Commerce Clause. In particular, this Part argues
that although the court reached the correct conclusion, its analysis was
unfaithful to precedent and incomplete. Part V argues that future courts
should adopt the reasoning applied by the Washington State Court of
Appeals when assessing the constitutionality of state Internet gambling
regulations. Part VI concludes.

14. Conon, supra note 9, at 1164.
15. Rousso v. State, 239 P.3d 1084, 1095 (Wash. 2010).
16. Id.
17. A Westlaw search yields no results for cases other than Rousso that address the constitutionality of a state’s Internet gambling law.
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II. AN UNCERTAIN REGULATORY SCHEME
Internet gambling raises a host of social concerns that both federal
and state laws have sought to address. This Part first identifies these concerns and then explains how current legislation operates to address these
concerns. In particular, section B provides an overview of two federal
statutes on the subject of Internet gambling, while section C provides an
overview of Washington’s Gambling Act.
A. Social Concerns Associated with Internet Gambling
The Internet gambling industry is estimated to bring in over $24
billion a year.18 Fueling the success of this industry is the fact that gambling online is simply easier than in traditional “brick-and-mortar” casinos.19 Instead of having to travel to a casino or lottery outlet to place a
bet, individuals can simply gamble while sitting at a home computer.20
Placing bets online allows individuals to avoid not only the inconvenience and other costs of traveling to a gambling venue, but also the reputational harm sometimes associated with gambling in a public place.21
And while roughly 86% of Americans have gambled or will gamble at
some point in their lives,22 this figure may soon increase as individuals
are able to gamble “in every home and every bedroom and every dorm
room, and on every iPhone, every BlackBerry, every laptop.”23
For lawmakers, the popularity of Internet gambling, coupled with
technological advancements, raise regulatory concerns in three particular
areas. First, children are susceptible targets of Internet gambling operations.24 Children are particularly captive audiences who spend considerable amounts of time on the Internet, often sitting unsupervised in front of
computer screens.25 Exacerbating this unsupervised access is the fact that
most gambling websites rely on a user to truthfully disclose his or her
correct age prior to gambling, often making little or no attempt to verify
the accuracy of the information before permitting the user to gamble.26
Because Internet gambling websites can be used anonymously, these un18. Anthony S. Broadman, Washington State Outbids Betcha.com, 14 GAMING L. REV. &
ECON 685, 687 (2010).
19. Jack Goldsmith, What Internet Gambling Legislation Teaches About Internet Regulation,
32 INT’L LAW. 1115, 1116 (1998).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. NAT’L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM’N, supra note 11, ch. 1, at 1.
23. Chan, supra note 1.
24. NAT’L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM’N, supra note 11, ch. 5, at 4.
25. Victoria Slade, Note, The Infancy Defense in the Modern Contract Age: A Useful Vestige,
34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 613, 637 (2011).
26. NAT’L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM’N, supra note 11, ch. 5, at 4.
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derage users may access—and potentially abuse—gambling websites
even if such websites request age verification.27
Second, compulsive gamblers are particularly vulnerable to the allure of Internet gambling.28 Internet games are available twenty-four
hours a day and offer instant gratification to individuals in the privacy of
their homes.29 This instant gratification, coupled with the ease with which
gambling information can be transmitted over the Internet, may “magnify
the potential destructiveness” of existing gambling addictions.30
Lastly, the lack of accountability and transparency associated with
Internet gambling may result in criminal abuse of online gambling operations. As one user describes, the absence of face-to-face interaction reduces the legitimacy of gambling online:
Not only are you not looking at your opponents, you’re not looking
at the cards being dealt, you’re not looking at who’s dealing them to
you. So, you don’t know if the whole thing is legitimate, even if all
the players sitting with you are just as legitimate as you are. Maybe
the whole game isn’t.31

Because Internet gambling businesses currently operate out of foreign
jurisdictions, these businesses could quickly alter, move, or entirely remove sites without users catching on.32 The ease of mobility and lack of
transparency associated with foreign Internet gambling operations thus
makes it possible for dishonest operators to take users’ money and
promptly close down without ever paying winnings.33
B. The Federal Response to Internet Gambling
In light of these social hazards, at least two federal statutes have
sought to prevent the interstate transmission of online gambling information: the Wire Act and the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement
Act (UIGEA).34 Both statutes, however, are vague and attempt to regu27. Id.
28. Id. ch. 5, at 5.
29. Id.
30. Id. (quoting Internet Gambling Prohibition Act: Hearing on H.R. 2380 Before the
Subcomm. on Crime, Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of Bernard P. Horn,
Director of Political Affairs of the National Coalition Against Gambling Expansion)).
31. How Online Gamblers Unmasked Cheaters, CBS NEWS, (June 28, 2009, 9:27 PM), http://
www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/11/25/60minutes/main4633254.shtml.
32. NAT’L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM’N, supra note 11, ch. 5, at 5.
33. Id.
34. Kevin F. King, Geolocation and Federalism on the Internet: Cutting Internet Gambling’s
Gordian Knot, 11 COLUM. SCI. & TECH L. REV. 41, 45 (2010). The Travel Act and the Illegal Gambling Business Act also touch on the subject of gambling. See id. Because the applicability of these
statutes to state Internet gambling laws was not addressed by the Washington courts in Rousso, they
are beyond the scope of this Note.
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late Internet gambling only indirectly; neither operates as an outright ban
of Internet gambling.
1. The Wire Act
The Wire Act of 1961 (the Wire Act) was one of the first federal
statutes used to question the legality of Internet gambling.35 Although the
Wire Act does not explicitly target gambling over the Internet, the statute
makes it a federal crime to knowingly use wire communications to place
bets or wagers through interstate or foreign commerce.36 The relevant
portion of the Wire Act provides:
Whoever being engaged in the business of betting or wagering
knowingly uses a wire communication facility for the transmission
in interstate or foreign commerce of bets or wagers or information
assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on any sporting event or
contest, or for the transmission of a wire communication which entitles the recipient to receive money or credit as a result of bets or
wagers, or for information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers,
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years,
or both.37

The statute also contains a rule of construction that exempts the transmission of a bet or wager between two or more states that each permit
gambling,38 which implicitly acknowledges the authority of the states to
regulate gambling within their borders.
Although the Wire Act was passed long before the advent of the Internet,39 many scholars believe that the statute’s reference to “a wire
communication facility” is sufficiently broad such that the statute could
also be read as prohibiting Internet gambling activities.40 Notably, the
35. Kraig P. Grahmann, Betting on Prohibition: The Federal Government’s Approach to Internet Gambling, 7 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 161, 167 (2009).
36. 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a).
37. Id. “The purpose of [the Wire Act] is to assist the various States and the District of Columbia in the enforcement of their laws pertaining to gambling, bookmaking, and like offenses and to
aid in the suppression of organized gambling activities by prohibiting the use of wire communication
facilities which are or will be used for the transmission of bets or wagers and gambling information
in interstate and foreign commerce.” H.R. Rep. No. 967, at 1 (1961), reprinted in 1961
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2631, 2631.
38. 18 U.S.C. § 1084(b) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent . . . the transmission of information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on a sporting event or contest from
a State . . . where betting on that sporting event or contest is legal into a State . . . in which such
betting is legal.”).
39. Rousso v. State, 204 P.3d 243, 248 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009).
40. See Ciaccio, supra note 8, at 532–33. Notwithstanding this view, there are at least three
other interpretations to the Wire Act, including that the statute (1) prohibits all Internet betting; (2)
prohibits only Internet sports betting; or (3) prohibits only Internet sports gambling that is not sanctioned by the Interstate Horseracing Act of 1978. Id. at 541.
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Department of Justice took the position that the Wire Act’s reach extended to all forms of gambling.41 Yet the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC)
within the Department of Justice recently cast doubt on such an interpretation when it concluded in an advisory opinion that the Wire Act extends only to the transmission of bets or wagers on a sporting event or
contest.42 Thus, at least according to the OLC, the Wire Act does not
prohibit any online gambling activity that is not a sporting event or contest.43 Because the OLC’s opinion is merely advisory,44 it is unclear
whether courts will accept this interpretation.
2. The UIGEA
45

The UIGEA is the most recent federal statute to regulate the interstate transfer of funds used for gambling purposes. Enacted in 2006, the
UIGEA extends the reach of the Wire Act and specifically addresses the
subject of Internet gambling.46 Under the UIGEA,
No person engaged in the business of betting or wagering may
knowingly accept, in connection with the participation of another
person in unlawful Internet gambling—(1) credit, or the proceeds of
credit, extended to or on behalf of such other person (including
credit extended through the use of a credit card); (2) an electronic
fund transfer, or funds transmitted by or through a money transmit41. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, Whether Proposals by Illinois and New York to
Use the Internet and Out-Of-State Transaction Processors to Sell Lottery Tickets to In-State Adults
Violate the Wire Act, 35 OPINIONS OF THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL 1, 1 (Sept. 20, 2011),
http://www.justice.gov/olc/2011/state-lotteries-opinion.pdf.
42. Id. at 3. The OLC refrained from answering whether such a ruling would conflict with the
UIGEA, although that issue was brought to its attention. Id.
43. Id. at 4. The OLC read the relevant portion of the Wire Act as consisting of two broad
clauses. Under the first clause, anyone engaged in the business of betting or wagering is barred from
knowingly using a wire communication facility “for the transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of bets or wagers or information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on any sporting
event or contest.” Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a)). “The second [clause] bars any such person from
knowingly using a wire communication facility to transmit communications that entitle the recipient
to ‘receive money or credit’ either ‘as a result of bets or wagers’ or ‘for information assisting in the
placing of bets or wagers.’” Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a)). Notably, the phrase “on any sporting
event or contest” appears in the first clause, but not the second. Id. Despite the absence of this phrase
in the second part of the statute, the OLC opined that in light of the statute’s text and legislative
history, the phrase “bets or wagers” in the second clause was best read as a reference to the phrase
“bets or wagers on any sporting event or contest” in the first clause. See id. at 5–12.
44. The OLC’s opinions are, however, generally considered binding on the Executive Branch.
Joseph Marchesano, Note, Where Lawfare Meets Lawsuit in the Case of Padilla v. Yoo, 34 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 1575, 1583 (2011).
45. 31 U.S.C § 5361–67.
46. Ciaccio, supra note 8, at 542. Several years after gambling first appeared on the Internet,
the National Gambling Impact Study Commission recommended that Congress pass legislation that
would prohibit wire transfers either to Internet gambling websites or from the banks that represent
such websites. 31 U.S.C. § 5361(a)(2).
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ting business, or the proceeds of an electronic fund transfer or money transmitting service, from or on behalf of such other person; (3)
any check, draft, or similar instrument which is drawn by or on behalf of such other person and is drawn on or payable at or through
any financial institution; or (4) the proceeds of any other form of financial transaction . . . which involves a financial institution as a
payor or financial intermediary on behalf of or for the benefit of
such other person.47

Although it criminalizes the processing or receipt of funds used in Internet gambling, the UIGEA does not altogether ban online gambling.48 Instead, by targeting the transfer of funds used for gambling purposes, the
UIGEA indirectly prohibits Internet gambling businesses from operating
in the United States.49
Despite its name, the UIGEA does little to clarify what types of Internet gambling are “unlawful gambling operations.”50 The statute does
not define what activities constitute “unlawful internet gambling,” leaving that determination to existing federal and state law.51 Moreover, the
statute only targets funds that flow to Internet gambling operators; it does
not apply to the individuals who place bets online.52
The UIGEA does not explicitly preempt state laws that regulate Internet gambling. Instead, the statute contains a rule of construction acknowledging that states may regulate Internet gambling within their borders: “No provision [of the UIGEA] shall be construed as altering, limiting, or extending any Federal or State law or Tribal-State compact prohibiting, permitting, or regulating gambling within the United States.”53
Thus, the UIGEA, like the Wire Act, envisions that states will continue
to regulate gambling to some degree.54
C. Washington’s Internet Gambling Ban
Washington responded to the social harms associated with Internet
gambling in 2006 when the state legislature proposed an amendment to

47. 31 U.S.C. § 5363.
48. King, supra note 34, at 45.
49. Grahmann, supra note 35, at 1.
50. Ciaccio, supra note 8, at 542.
51. Id.. The statute defines “unlawful internet gambling” as “plac[ing], receiv[ing], or otherwise knowingly transmit[ting] a bet or wager by any means which involves the use, at least in part,
of the Internet where such bet or wager is unlawful under any applicable Federal or State law in the
State or Tribal lands in which the bet or wager is initiated, received, or otherwise made.” 31 U.S.C.
§ 5362(10)(a).
52. Ciaccio, supra note 8, at 543.
53. 31 U.S.C. § 5361(b).
54. Rousso v. State, 204 P.3d 243, 248 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009).
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the state’s Gambling Act of 1973.55 The purpose of the amendment was
to “reaffirm[] and clarify[] the prohibition against internet and certain
other interactive electronic or mechanical devices to engage in gambling.”56 Testimony on the bill urged that the bill was needed to reaffirm
the state’s policy “prohibiting gambling that exploits . . . new technologies.”57 The amendment received overwhelming support from the legislature, passing by a vote of forty-four to three.58
In its current form, the Gambling Act is a sweeping prohibition
against all aspects of online gambling. The Act provides, “Whoever
knowingly transmits or receives gambling information by . . . the internet, a telecommunications transmission system, or similar means, or
knowingly installs or maintains equipment for the transmission or receipt
of gambling information shall be guilty of a class C felony . . . .”59 Thus,
not only is it illegal for Washington residents to gamble online, but it is
also illegal to operate an Internet gambling website; to install or maintain
equipment to send or receive gambling information; and to facilitate Internet gambling in any way.60
The Act criminalizes the transmission of “gambling information,” a
phrase that encompasses “any wager made in the course of and any information intended to be used for professional gambling.”61 Under this
55. S.B. 6613, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2006).
56. Id. The senate’s recommendation to modify the Gambling Act arose partly out of its concern that the judiciary might find that the state’s existing gambling laws permitted certain forms of
online gambling. Id. The state was a defendant to a case where it was argued that the state’s existing
gambling laws empowered the Washington Lottery Commission to authorize electronic gambling
devices. Id.
57. Id. In addition to this concern, the legislature also stated that prohibiting all forms of Internet gambling was necessary to support the state’s policy against lawsuits and other legal challenges.
Id. Specifically, the legislature feared challenges brought under various international trade agreements; challenges in enforcement actions prosecuted in cooperation with federal law enforcement
agencies; and challenges in negotiations under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. Id.
58. Id.
59. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.46.240.
60. WASH. STATE GAMBLING COMM’N, GC5-228, ILLEGAL INTERNET GAMBLING 1 (Oct.
2011), www.wsgc.wa.gov/newsletters/5-228.pdf.
61. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.46.0245. A person is defined as engaging in professional gambling
when:
(a) Acting other than as a player or in the manner authorized by this chapter, the
person knowingly engages in conduct which materially aids any form of gambling activity; or
(b) Acting other than in a manner authorized by this chapter, the person pays a fee
to participate in a card game, contest of chance, lottery, or other gambling activity; or
(c) Acting other than as a player or in the manner authorized by this chapter, the
person knowingly accepts or receives money or other property pursuant to an agreement
or understanding with any other person whereby he or she participates or is to participate
in the proceeds of gambling activity; or
(d) The person engages in bookmaking; or
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expansive definition, any wager placed over the Internet from Washington—whether for a penny or for several hundred dollars—could subject a
user to criminal penalties.62 In addition, because the Act criminalizes the
“receipt” of gambling information, the law could apply to any Internet
gambling operator that receives a bet from an individual located in
Washington,63 even if that business operates far outside the state’s borders.64
The Gambling Act is striking not only because of its scope, but also
because of the severity of the punishment associated with violations. Violations of the Act range from a misdemeanor to a felony,65 and persons
convicted of Internet gambling in Washington may face a maximum
penalty of five years in prison, a $10,000 fine, or both.66 Some have
characterized this punishment as particularly harsh: “[In] Washington[]
. . . Internet gambling is a class C felony, the same as third-degree
rape.”67 Others have characterized the law as hypocritically excessive:
“Martians might have a difficult time understanding that if you play poker online for money in the state of Washington, you’re committing a
class C felony.”68
Notwithstanding the myriad of reasons the legislature may have had
to ban Internet gambling in Washington, the state’s law enforcement
nonetheless may face significant hurdles in its efforts to curb or eliminate
the activity.69 Most Internet gambling businesses operate in foreign jurisdictions under licenses granted by those jurisdictions,70 making it chal-

(e) The person conducts a lottery; or
(f) The person violates [Wash. Rev. Code] § 9.46.039.
WASH. REV. CODE § 9.46.0269. Furthermore, in Washington, funds do not need to be wagered for a
‘bet’ to be placed; the mere opportunity to gamble may fall within this definition. See Internet Cmty
& Entm’t Corp. v. Wash. State Gambling Comm’n, 238 P.3d 1163, 1167 (Wash. 2010).
62. Appellant’s Opening Brief at 4, Rousso v. State, 239 P.3d 1084 (Wash. 2010) (No.
83040-1), 2009 WL 6083567.
63. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.46.240.
64. Whether the state could prosecute an out-of-state actor for such a violation raises a jurisdictional question that is beyond the scope of this Note.
65. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.46.240; WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.20.021.
66. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.20.021.
67. Ciaccio, supra note 8, at 549.
68. Michael Hiltzik, Calling America’s Bluff on Internet Gambling, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2009,
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/oct/19/business/fi-hiltzik19 (quoting Joseph M. Kelly).
69. In Washington, enforcement of the Gambling Act is focused on “larger, higher level internet gambling activities,” which includes the operation of gambling websites and service providers.
WASH. STATE GAMBLING COMM’N, GC5-165, ILLEGAL INTERNET GAMBLING 2 (Feb. 2012),
http://www.wsgc.wa.gov/newsletters/internet_gambling_brochure.pdf. Although the state does not
currently have an active campaign against individuals who gamble online in the state, the state does
warn that such players run the risk of prosecution. Id.
70. NAT’L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM’N, supra note 11, ch. 2, at 16.
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lenging—if not impossible—for state law enforcement officials to effectively prosecute violations of the Act.71
III. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE: A NUCLEAR BOMB OF STATE
INTERNET REGULATIONS
In Rousso, the Washington State Supreme Court noted that, although neither the Wire Act nor the UIGEA purports to preempt state
Internet gambling laws, this does not mean that Washington can regulate
Internet gambling with impunity.72 Accordingly, both the Washington
Court of Appeals and the Washington State Supreme Court applied the
dormant Commerce Clause to assess whether the Gambling Act impermissibly interfered with the federal government’s constitutional authority
over interstate commerce.73
This Part provides an overview of the dormant Commerce Clause,
beginning with the origins of the Clause, along with the legal standard
that courts apply. It then discusses how courts have applied the dormant
Commerce Clause with regard to state regulations affecting the Internet.
A. Origin and Policies Behind The Dormant Commerce Clause
Despite its name, the dormant Commerce Clause does not appear in
the Constitution; instead, it is a negative inference drawn by the Supreme
Court in recognition of powers granted to the federal government under
Article I of the United States Constitution.74 Article I grants the federal
government the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”75 Although
this language speaks in terms of a positive grant of power to the federal
government, the Supreme Court has long recognized that this positive
grant of authority also implies a limitation on the power of the states to

71. Id. Notably, some state officials have sought to address these enforcement difficulties by
calling for a national response to online gambling. See id. In its plea for a federal response to Internet
gambling, the National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) noted that state laws on Internet
gambling are frustratingly ineffective. Id. Citing “[t]he jurisdictional uniqueness of the Internet,” the
NAAG called on Congress to enact a national response to Internet gambling activities that evade
state regulations. Id.
72. Rousso v. State, 239 P.3d 1084, 1088 (Wash. 2010).
73. See infra Part IV.
74. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 326 (1979).
75. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Founding Fathers also recognized the need to “restrain[]
by national control . . . injurious impediments to the intercourse [among the States].” THE
FEDERALIST No. 22, at 144-45 (Alexander Hamilton).
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erect barriers against interstate trade.76 It is from this negative implication that the dormant Commerce Clause arose.
The dormant Commerce Clause is thus a judge-made doctrine77
aimed at prohibiting “differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state
economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter.”78
Hailed as “essential to the foundations of the Union,”79 the dormant
Commerce Clause serves as a bulwark against state laws that interfere
with or impede a strong national economy.80 To that end, the doctrine
reflects the policies that one state should not foreclose others from access
to its market; that states may not enact laws to give themselves competitive advantages; and that states should not rival one another for favored
status of citizens.81
While originalists may scoff at the existence of a doctrine not found
in the Constitution,82 two justifications underlie the existence and application of the dormant Commerce Clause. First, the doctrine ensures economic efficiency of a national market.83 By analyzing whether state regulations cast economic burdens on out-of-state businesses, the judiciary’s
recognition of the dormant Commerce Clause is a means of protecting
unrestricted trade among the states and securing the economic benefits of
a free market.84 Second, the doctrine preserves the representative process
of law making.85 By analyzing the effect a state law has on out-of-state
businesses, the judiciary’s application of the doctrine is a means of ensuring that out-of-state actors do not bear the costs of a law that passed
without the votes of their representative legislatures.86

76. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 326 (“The Commerce Clause has . . . been interpreted by th[e] Court
not only as an authorization for congressional action, but also, even in the absence of a conflicting
federal statute, as a restriction on permissible state regulation.”).
77. Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 110
YALE L.J. 785, 786 (2001).
78. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 472 (2005) (quoting Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of
Envtl. Quality of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994)).
79. Id.
80. See id. (noting that the dormant Commerce Clause reflects a central concern of the Framers, which was that in order to succeed, the Union would have to avoid tendencies toward “economic
Balkinzation”).
81. Id.
82. Justice Scalia, for example, has criticized the dormant Commerce Clause as requiring an
inquiry into “whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy.” Bendix Autolite
Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring).
83. Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 77, at 790.
84. Id. at 788.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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B. The Legal Standard
Under the dormant Commerce Clause, a statute may be invalidated
if it discriminates against interstate commerce, and courts look for two
types of discrimination: express discrimination and implicit discrimination.87
To determine whether a state regulation withstands scrutiny under
the dormant Commerce Clause, a court first scrutinizes the language of
the challenged law. In doing so, the court looks to see whether the language of the challenged law draws distinctions between in-state and outof-state economic interests.88 If the state law discriminates against outof-state businesses in favor of local interests, it will be subjected to “the
strictest scrutiny” to determine whether there is a legitimate local purpose and an absence of nondiscriminatory alternatives.89
If the language of the state law is nondiscriminatory, a court examines whether the law nonetheless “impinges on interstate commerce”90 in
its practical effect. To determine if the effect of a state law is to discriminate against interstate commerce, a court must weigh the state’s interests
in passing the law against the burdens the law imposes on interstate
commerce.91 If a state statute regulates “even-handedly” to promote a
legitimate state interest and affects interstate commerce only incidentally, it is upheld.92 However, if the statute imposes burdens on interstate
commerce that are clearly excessive in relation to the state benefits, a
court will examine whether the state’s objective could have been accomplished in a less burdensome manner.93 If the state has a legitimate purpose in the regulation, then the extent of the burden on interstate commerce that a court will tolerate depends on both the nature of the state
interest and whether that interest could be promoted equally by less restrictive means.94
In analyzing the burdens that a state law imposes on interstate
commerce, a court is not limited to considering the financial costs imposed on out-of-state actors. Goldsmith and Sykes, two leading scholars
on state Internet regulations under the dormant Commerce Clause, have
also opined that the Clause prohibits conduct that (1) creates inconsisten87. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979) (explaining that courts must inquire
whether a state statute discriminates against interstate commerce either on its face or in practical
effect).
88. See id.
89. Id. at 337.
90. Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 77, at 788.
91. Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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cies among the states and (2) regulates conduct occurring wholly outside
of the state.95 The scholars’ arguments are rooted firmly in Supreme
Court jurisprudence. For example, in CTS Corporation v. Dynamics
Corporation of America, the Court held that the Clause also prohibited
state regulations that “adversely affect interstate commerce by subjecting
activities to inconsistent regulations.”96 This maxim does not mandate
uniformity among state laws,97 but instead looks to whether the inconsistencies between state laws create compliance costs that are clearly excessive in relation to local benefits.98 In addition, in Healy v. Beer Institute, the Supreme Court struck down a Connecticut law that had the effect of limiting the ability of out-of-state beer shippers to alter their prices outside of Connecticut.99 The “critical inquiry,” the Court held, was
“whether the practical effect of the regulation [was] to control conduct
beyond the boundaries of the State.”100
C. The Internet and the Dormant Commerce Clause
When applied to state Internet regulations, the scope of the dormant
Commerce Clause is not always clear. This uncertainty has led critics to
deem the doctrine a “nuclear bomb of a legal theory” of state Internet
regulations.101
That metaphor is an apt description of early judicial decisions on
Internet regulations. For example, in American Libraries Association v.
Pataki,102 one of the most controversial cases on state Internet regulations, a district court enjoined enforcement of a New York statute that
prohibited the transmission of pornographic communications over the
Internet.103 In doing so, the court reasoned that because the Internet had
no jurisdictional boundaries, New York’s law might subject an actor to
“haphazard, uncoordinated, and even outright inconsistent regulations”
by states.104 According to the court, “[t]he nature of the Internet ma[de] it
impossible to restrict the effects” of the Internet regulation that fall outside the regulating state.105 Exacerbating this concern was the fact that
95. Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 77, at 789.
96. 481 U.S. 69, 88 (1987).
97. Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 77, at 790.
98. State v. Heckel, 24 P.3d 404, 411 (Wash. 2001) (adopting the analysis of Goldsmith and
Sykes and recognizing that the inconsistent regulations and extraterritoriality inquiries are proper
facets of the dormant Commerce Clause).
99. 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989).
100. Id.
101. Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 77, at 787.
102. Am. Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
103. Id. at 178–79.
104. Id. at 168.
105. Id. at 177.
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information transmitted over the Internet appeared simultaneously in
every state: “Once a provider posts content on the Internet, it is available
to all other Internet users worldwide.”106
American Libraries thus stands for the extreme proposition that
states simply may not pass laws affecting the Internet. Under the approach in American Libraries, “the Commerce Clause precludes a state
from enacting legislation that has the practical effect of exporting that
state’s domestic policies.”107 This bright-line rule prohibits any state law
concerning economic activity conducted over the Internet because, under
the court’s line of reasoning, Internet service providers could send content into every state, and state governments could not stop the flow of
this content at the borders.108 Like the Internet itself, the reach of the
court’s logic has no boundaries: any state law affecting the Internet
would likely be unconstitutional.
While some jurisdictions have followed the American Libraries approach regarding state regulation of the Internet,109 the view is not without criticism. Some scholars maintain that American Libraries represents
“an impoverished understanding” of the Internet, misreads dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, and misunderstands the economics of
state regulation of transborder transactions.110 Despite these criticisms,
the reasoning in American Libraries continues to be invoked by those
who argue that state regulations of the Internet have effects beyond a
state’s borders, create inconsistent obligations, and impose burdens on
interstate commerce that outweigh their local benefits.111
Yet the bright-line rule of American Libraries view has largely given way towards a more balanced approach. As the Washington courts’
analyses in Rousso demonstrates, the dormant Commerce Clause provides an appropriate vehicle for assessing whether state Internet gambling laws impose impermissible burdens on interstate commerce.

106. Id. at 167 (quoting ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 844 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d, 521 U.S.
844 (1997)).
107. Id. at 174.
108. Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 77, at 785.
109. See, e.g., PSINet, Inc. v. Chapman, 362 F.3d 227, 239–40 (4th Cir. 2004); Am.
Booksellers Found. v. Dean, 342 F.3d 96, 102–04 (2d Cir. 2003); ACLU v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149,
1161–62 (10th Cir. 1999); Cyberspace Comm’ns, Inc. v. Engler, 55 F. Supp. 2d 737, 751–52 (E.D.
Mich. 1999), aff’d and remanded, 238 F.3d 420 (6th Cir. 2000).
110. Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 77, at 787; see also Laura Vanderstappen, Note, Internet
Pharmacies and the Specter of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 22 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 619
(2006); Presidents and Fellows of Harvard College, Recent Development—The Dormant Commerce
Clause and the Internet, American Booksellers Foundation v. Dean, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 296
(2003).
111. Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 77, at 787.
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IV. ROUSSO V. STATE: THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO
WASHINGTON’S INTERNET GAMBLING BAN
This Part begins with an overview of Rousso’s factual and procedural background. It then discusses in turn how the Washington Court of
Appeals and the Washington State Supreme Court applied a dormant
Commerce Clause analysis to Rousso’s constitutional challenge.
A. Case Background and Procedural History
Lee Rousso, a poker enthusiast, began his gambling career in 2003
after learning of the rags-to-riches story of Chris Moneymaker, a World
Series of Poker Champion.112 From 2003 until 2006, Rousso participated
in poker games with people around the world through the website
pokerstars.com.113 While on the website, Rousso played in “ring” or
“cash” games where the chips on the virtual table represented actual
money.114 Rousso deemed himself a “skilled amateur” who managed to
win a qualifying tournament for the 2005 World Series of Poker.115
Yet Rousso’s aspirations of a World Series of Poker Title were
short-lived. After July 6, 2007, the effective date of Washington’s Internet gambling ban, Rousso committed a criminal act of professional gambling each time he paid fees to play poker online.116 Thus, on the opening day of the 2007 World Series of Poker Main Event, Rousso filed an
action in King County Superior Court, seeking a declaration that Washington’s ban on Internet gambling was unconstitutional.117 Rousso based
his claim on two theories: that the Gambling Act was a mere protectionist measure designed to discriminate against otherwise legal out-of-state
businesses and in favor of Washington businesses; and that the Gambling
Act interfered with Congress’s authority to regulate interstate and international commerce.118
The trial court denied Rousso’s request for relief,119 and Rousso appealed. On appeal, Rousso argued that the lower court “failed to recog112. Appellant’s Opening Brief at 2, Rousso v. State, 239 P.3d 1084 (Wash. 2010) (No. 830401), 2009 WL 6083567. In 2003, Chris Moneymaker defeated 839 players in the World Series of
Poker Main Event and won $2,500,000. Moneymaker qualified for the Event by playing poker over
the Internet. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Complaint at 1–5, Rousso v. State, 239 P.3d 1084 (Wash. 2010) (No. 07-2-22438-6
KNT), 2007 WL 5754725 at *1–5.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Declaratory Judgment and Granting Defendant’s
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Rousso v. State, 239 P.3d 1084 (Wash. 2010) (No. 07-222438-6 KNT), 2008 WL 4690005.
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nize the State’s hypocrisy with respect to gambling . . . or chose to reward it.”120
B. The Decision of the Washington Court of Appeals
Rousso’s request for relief fared no better with the Washington
Court of Appeals. First, after determining that the dormant Commerce
Clause provided the appropriate standard with which to review the
claim,121 the court quickly disposed of the argument that the language of
the Gambling Act discriminated against interstate commerce.122 As the
court correctly noted, the language of the Act applied equally to in-state
and out-of-state actors and businesses.123
Second, the court addressed Rousso’s argument that the effect of
the Act was to discriminate against interstate commerce by restricting
Washington poker players to gamble in state.124 According to Rousso, the
purpose of the state’s ban on Internet gambling was mere economic protectionism.125 To illustrate this alleged economic protectionism, Rousso
pointed out that the volume of legal gambling in Washington increased
from $33.5 million to $1,695.3 million within a thirty-year period, “a
staggering fifty-fold increase in legal gambling!”126 These figures,
Rousso claimed, showed that the state had a significant economic interest
in protecting its brick-and-mortar gambling operations.127 Thus, he argued, when “[st]ripped of legislative pretensions,” these figures demonstrated that “prosecutions under the Gambling Act [did] not serve the
purpose of policing public morals, but, instead, punished encroachments
on the State’s monopoly.”128
The court disagreed with Rousso’s characterization of the Gambling Act’s effects. First, the court examined Washington’s long history
of regulating gambling, as well as its legitimate need to regulate an activ120. Appellant’s Opening Brief at 12, Rousso v. State, 239 P.3d 1084 (Wash. 2010) (No.
84040-1), 2009 WL 6083567. The “hypocrisy” Rousso referred to was the fact that Washington law
permitted him to play poker in a licensed card room, but not online. Brief for the Poker Players
Alliance as Amicus Curiae in Support of Lee H. Rousso at 1, Rousso, 239 P.3d 1084 (No. 83040-1),
2010 WL 2206096.
121. The court concluded that the dormant Commerce Clause applied because, although various federal laws affect Internet gambling, none of those laws expressly authorized otherwise unconstitutional state laws regulating Internet gambling. Rousso v. State, 204 P.3d 243, 246 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2009).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Appellant’s Opening Brief at 11-12, Rousso v. State, 239 P.3d 1084 (Wash. 2010) (No.
84040-1), 2009 WL 6083567.
125. See id. at 11.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 11–12.
128. Id. at 11.
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ity that fell into “the category of social and economic evils.”129 A review
of the history of Washington’s gambling laws demonstrated that the state
had a longstanding and legitimate interest in controlling gambling.130
That interest was a “pure exercise of the traditional police power,” and it
was justified by the state’s desire to safeguard its citizens both from the
harms of gambling itself and from professional gambling’s “historically
close relationship with organized crime.”131 These long-standing and legitimate interests in controlling gambling made it doubtful that the state
could effectively address the harms associated with Internet gambling
without directly regulating the transmission of gambling information.132
Having found that the state had a legitimate interest in regulating
online gambling, the court then addressed the burdens imposed by the
Gambling Act. The court recognized that the Gambling Act was problematic in at least one regard: the Gambling Act purported to impose
criminal liability on Internet gambling businesses that were not located in
Washington and on businesses that did not actively solicit wagers from
Washington residents.133 Accordingly, the Gambling Act implicated the
dual Commerce Clause prohibitions against legislation that creates inconsistencies among the states and regulates conduct occurring wholly
outside of Washington.134 The court noted that this standard was established by the Washington State Supreme Court in State v. Heckel, a case
in which the court expressly adopted Goldsmith and Sykes’ inconsistent
regulations and extraterritoriality tests for purposes of state Internet regulations.135
Despite recognizing that the Act implicated the potential to create
inconsistencies among the states, the court focused its analysis on how
the Act regulated conduct occurring outside the state.136 Specifically, the
court recognized that the Gambling Act’s criminal penalties could apply
to a passive website like pokerstars.com, a business that operates far beyond Washington’s borders.137 Nonetheless, the court found solace in the
fact that an Internet business such as pokerstars.com could easily deter129. Rousso v. State, 204 P.3d 243, 250 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009).
130. Id. at 251. The court noted that from its inception, the state had considered gambling to be
an activity with significant negative effects—a view expressed in the original form of article II,
section 24 of the Washington constitution. Id. at 250.
131. Id. at 251.
132. Id. Specifically, the court questioned whether the state would be able to regulate Internet
gambling indirectly, as to do so might require discerning when residents are engaged in gambling
over the Internet—an inquiry that might implicate residents’ privacy rights. See id.
133. Id. at 251–52.
134. Id. at 252.
135. Id. (citing State v. Heckel, 24 P.3d 404 (Wash. 2001)).
136. Id. at 252–53
137. Id. at 253.
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mine a user’s geographical location based on the Internet protocol (IP)
address of his or her computer.138 To the court, the criminal penalties
associated with violations of the Gambling Act were assuaged by the fact
that technology made compliance with the Act relatively simple.139
At its core, the court reasoned, Rousso’s constitutional claim was
based on the notion that the borderless nature of the Internet rendered
unconstitutional any state law that attempted to regulate it.140 This argument reflected a “simplistic understanding” of the Internet’s architecture.141 Drawing heavily from Goldsmith and Sykes, the court characterized as “overbroad” all formulations of the dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine that precluded state Internet regulations.142 In doing so, the court
rejected the American Libraries view of state Internet regulations.143 The
proper test for state regulations of the Internet, the court concluded, was
the dormant Commerce Clause approach: a balancing test that looked to
whether regulation imposed burdens on commerce that were “clearly
excessive.”144
Applying this balancing test, the court determined that Washington’s Gambling Act withstood Rousso’s constitutional challenge. The
court concluded: “[G]iven the importance of the State’s interests in protecting its citizens from the ills associated with gambling, and the relatively small cost imposed on out-of-state businesses by complying with
the Gambling Act, Rousso has failed to meet his burden of showing that
the Gambling Act is ‘clearly excessive.’”145
C. The Washington State Supreme Court’s Decision
On appeal, the Washington State Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of Washington’s Internet gambling ban.146 The court’s reasoning, however, differed slightly from that of the court of appeals.
As a threshold matter, the court determined that the dormant Commerce Clause applied.147 It reasoned that although the Wire Act and
UIGEA also regulated interstate Internet gambling, neither statute dele138. Id. For a compelling argument regarding how geolocation technologies—which make it
possible to quickly, cheaply, and accurately identify an Internet user’s location—could allow states
to make Internet gambling laws more effective and efficient, see King, supra note 34.
139. Rousso, 204 P.3d at 253.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See id. at 252–53 (declining to follow those cases that view the Internet as entirely offlimits to state regulation).
144. Id. at 253.
145. Id.
146. Rousso v. State, 239 P.3d 1084, 1095 (Wash. 2010).
147. Id. at 1088.
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gated to the states the express authority to do so.148 Furthermore, although these federal statutes recognized the authority of the states to
regulate Internet gambling within their borders, neither permitted the
states to do so with impunity.149
Accordingly, the court then analyzed whether the Gambling Act
discriminated against interstate commerce either in its language or in its
effect. Like the court of appeals, the supreme court concluded that the
language of the Act was not discriminatory.150 The Act, the court reasoned, prohibited Internet gambling equally, drawing no distinctions with
regard to where the gambling occurred.151
Next, the court addressed whether the Gambling Act discriminated
against interstate commerce in its practical effect.152 Although Rousso
argued that discrimination could be found in the economic protectionism
at work behind the Act, the court rejected this argument as both misconstruing and misapplying the legal standard.153 To Rousso, the Act affected interstate commerce by walling off the Washington market from the
Internet gambling market to preserve the state’s local gambling operations.154 But the relevant inquiry, the court claimed, was “how the effects
of the [Gambling Act] are imposed on in-state and out-of-state entities,
not what the effect is on those entities’ revenue.”155 Furthermore, an increase in business for Washington’s in-state gambling businesses was
merely a secondary effect of the Gambling Act, not a direct effect.156
Moreover, the court distinguished Internet gambling and brick-andmortar gambling as two different activities that presented different risks
and concerns, and thus created different regulatory challenges.157 In light
of these differences, the state did not need to regulate Internet gambling
and brick-and-mortar gambling in the same manner.158
While the court found no economic protectionism at work in the
Act, it nonetheless recognized that the Act imposed a burden on interstate commerce by “walling off the Washington market for Internet gam148. Id.
149. See id. (noting that the Wire Act and the UIGEA “recognize and expressly preserve a
state’s authority to criminalize some or all gambling activities within the state’s borders, but nothing
more”).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1089.
155. Id.
156. Id. The court noted that the U.S. Supreme Court had rejected a similar secondary effects
argument. Id. at 1089–90 (citing Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981)).
157. Id. at 1091–92.
158. Id.
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bling.”159 Yet to the court, two facts mitigated the extent of this burden.
First, the Act did not prevent or hinder Internet gambling business from
operating outside the state.160 And second, Internet gambling business
could “easily exclude Washingtonians.”161 Such exclusion, the court reasoned, could be achieved if Internet gambling businesses required a user
to identify his or her location before placing a bet online.162 In sum, the
court concluded that the Act’s burden on interstate commerce equated to
but did not outweigh the substantial state interest stemming from the
state’s police power to protect the health, welfare, safety, and morals of
its citizens.163
Lastly, the court found that Washington could not achieve its interest in protecting the health, safety, and morals of its citizens through a
means less restrictive than the Gambling Act. Although Rousso argued
that the state could have accomplished its interest in a manner less restrictive than an outright ban on Internet gambling,164 the court refrained
from second-guessing legislative policies in such a manner. To the court,
it was unclear whether a less restrictive regulation could address the social harms of Internet gambling as effectively as a complete ban.165 In
addition, even if such a less restrictive regulation was possible, it was not
clear that such a regulation would decrease the burden on interstate
commerce.166
Having concluded that the Act did not impose excessive burdens on
interstate commerce and that the state could not regulate Internet gambling as effectively with a less restrictive means, the supreme court held
that Washington’s Gambling Act did not violate the dormant Commerce
Clause.167

159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1091. The court noted,
[T]he legislature balanced public policy concerns and determined the interests of Washington are best served by banning Internet gambling. The legislature chose the advantages and disadvantages of a ban over the advantages and disadvantages of regulation.
The evidence is not conclusive. Many may disagree with the outcome. But the court has
no authority to replace the legislature’s choice with its own.
Id. at 1095.
167. Id.
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V. CRITIQUE AND PROPOSAL
The decision set forth by the Washington State Supreme Court suffers from three significant flaws. First, the Washington State Supreme
Court did not identify or otherwise articulate that the inconsistent regulations test and extraterritoriality analysis were facets of the dormant
Commerce Clause. Yet as the court of appeals noted, the supreme court’s
earlier decision in Heckel makes clear that the supreme court has adopted
these tests for purposes of assessing state laws affecting the Internet.168
While it is possible that the supreme court may have collapsed these tests
into its general discussion of the burdens imposed by the Gambling Act,
the opinion does not hint that such a synthesis actually occurred. Instead,
the court’s failure to specifically identify these tests suggests that it
strayed from its own precedent and turned instead to a less rigorous
dormant Commerce Clause analysis.
It may be that the Washington State Supreme Court simply failed to
consider inconsistencies and extraterritorialities for a practical reason:
because federal law indirectly prohibits Internet gambling businesses
from operating in the United States, all Internet gambling businesses operate in foreign jurisdictions.169 Thus, because there are currently no Internet gambling businesses operating in the United States, there is little
risk that the state’s Gambling Act will render inconsistent outcomes or
impose costs of compliance beyond the state’s borders. But in light of the
recent attempts by other states to legalize Internet gambling, it may be
necessary, if not crucial, for future courts to assess these factors. For example, because Washington’s law applies to the receipt of gambling information by Internet gambling websites,170 it could be possible that if
New Jersey legalized Internet gambling, Washington’s criminal penalties
would apply to those New Jersey businesses that were operating lawfully
in that state.171 But under the Washington State Supreme Court’s decision, there is no articulated basis for future courts to consider whether
such an outcome is a burden by virtue of the inconsistencies imposed.
Yet the Washington Court of Appeals explicitly acknowledged that
courts must apply the inconsistent regulations and extraterritorialities
tests in a dormant Commerce Clause analysis.172 Adopting the reasoning
of the court of appeals would provide future courts with a more struc168. See State v. Heckel, 24 P.3d 404, 412 (Wash. 2001) (“The inconsistent-regulations test
and the extraterritoriality analysis are appropriately regarded as facets of the Pike balancing
test . . . .”).
169. See supra Part II.B–C.
170. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.46.240.
171. See id.
172. Rousso v. State, 204 P.3d 243, 251 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009).
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tured basis for resolving potential conflicts among state Internet gambling laws.
Second, the Washington State Supreme Court’s conclusion that the
Gambling Act did not “prevent or hinder” Internet gambling businesses
from operating outside the state was overbroad. As the court of appeals
recognized, the Gambling Act does hinder such businesses from operating insofar as Washington attaches criminal penalties for knowing violations of the Act.173 The supreme court, however, confined its analysis to
considering the extent to which “walling off the Washington market”
was a burden on interstate commerce.174 The court’s failure to recognize
this potential externality suggests that it did not rigorously consider the
extent to which Washington’s Gambling Act might impose costs beyond
the state’s borders. The court of appeals, however, specifically acknowledged as problematic the fact that the Act exported criminal penalties to
passive websites that operated far outside of Washington’s borders.175
The appellate court’s treatment of this factor shows that, although a law’s
exportation of criminal liability is a burden courts must consider in a
dormant Commerce Clause challenge, the existence of such criminal liability can also be mitigated by other factors, such as the relative ease of
compliance.176
Third, the supreme court’s method of measuring how the burdens
imposed by the Act could be mitigated rests on shaky grounds. To the
supreme court, the burdens imposed by the Gambling Act were not excessive because Internet gambling businesses could “easily” comply with
the state’s ban by requesting age verification before permitting users to
gamble.177 While this may be true, the supreme court overlooks the
anonymous nature of Internet use. Because the Internet can be used
anonymously, individuals—including children—could lie about their
ages to bypass such verifications,178 and it is thus unclear whether a website that relies solely on self-reported age verifications could be said to
knowingly violate the Gambling Act and thus be subject to criminal penalties.
Instead, the court of appeals’ rationale that Internet websites could
determine user location based on IP addresses provides a more useful
basis for measuring the burden imposed by the Act. Such measures
would permit Internet gambling businesses to exclude users based on the
173. Id.
174. Rousso v. State, 239 P.3d 1084, 1091-92 (Wash. 2010).
175. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.46.240.
176. Rousso, 204 P.3d at 251.
177. Id.
178. See supra Part II.A.
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state of origin,179 which in turn could prevent such businesses from becoming unknowing recipients of unlawful transmissions of gambling
information from those states. Although the court vaguely cited the “relatively small cost” of adopting such a measure,180 its proposition that Internet businesses can exclude users based on IP address provides a more
accurate and concrete example for future courts to follow when measuring the cost of compliance with similar state Internet gambling acts.
Although both courts ultimately concluded that Washington’s Internet gambling statute survives a dormant Commerce Clause challenge,
the means by which they arrived at their conclusions differ greatly.
Whereas the Washington State Supreme Court’s decision suffers from
several flaws, the decision of the court of appeals rests squarely on precedent and provides a more concrete basis for future courts to measure
state Internet gambling laws. Thus, future courts should adopt the rationale of the court of appeals in Rousso when analyzing the constitutionality of a state Internet gambling regulation under the dormant Commerce Clause.
VI. CONCLUSION
Current political pressure for states to pass laws legalizing Internet
gambling181 makes it all too likely that other state courts will soon face
constitutional challenges similar to that in Rousso. Although the dormant
Commerce Clause is not a novel doctrine, courts faced with such challenges will almost inevitably look to Rousso as persuasive precedent on
how to apply this doctrine to a state Internet gambling law. Those courts,
however, should not look to the Washington State Supreme Court’s opinion for such guidance; instead, courts should adopt the reasoning set
forth by the Washington Court of Appeals.
As the decisions in Rousso show, the dormant Commerce Clause is
an appropriate vehicle for assessing the constitutionality of state Internet
gambling laws. Applying a rule that prohibits any state regulation affecting the Internet is likely overbroad, which is illustrated by both Washington courts’ rejections of the American Libraries decision. Moreover,
such a rule is not faithful to the current statutory scheme: both the Wire
Act and the UIGEA envision that states will regulate gambling to some
degree.182
Ultimately, the decision of the court of appeals provides a more
rigorous application of the dormant Commerce Clause for future courts
179. Rousso, 204 P.3d at 251.
180. Id.
181. See supra Part I.
182. Rousso, 204 P.3d at 248.
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to look to. Most significantly, the court of appeals, unlike the supreme
court, recognized that state Internet gambling laws implicate the potential
for inconsistencies among the states and costs imposed beyond state borders, both of which are proper components of the dormant Commerce
Clause.183 In light of the “jurisdictional uniqueness” of the Internet,184 the
appellate court’s decision provides a clearer and more rigorous standard
that courts should look to when applying the dormant Commerce Clause
to similar laws.

183. Id. at 251.
184. NAT’L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM’N, supra note 11, ch. 2, at 16.

